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Is fundamentalism universal across religious cultures? We investigated this issue by focusing 
on three questions: (1) the dimensionality of fundamentalism, as measured by the Religious 
Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004); (2) the very nature of 
fundamentalism as denoting dogmatic belief, moral rigorism, or strong groupness; and (3) 
interreligious prejudice as predicted uniquely, additively, or interactively by religiousness and 
socio-cognitive rigidity. We collected data from 14 countries of Catholic, Protestant, Christian 
Orthodox, Buddhist, Jewish, and Muslim tradition, regrouped in seven cultural-religious 
zones (N = 3,218 young adults). We measured fundamentalism, the four dimensions of 
religiousness (believing, bonding, behaving, and belonging), authoritarianism, existential 
quest, and interreligious prejudice—negative and discriminatory attitudes toward various 
religious outgroups and atheists. Across religious cultures, we found that: (1) the scale is 
unidimensional; (2) fundamentalism is best conceptualized as a combination of dogmatic 
belief (believing and low existential quest) and moral rigorism (behaving and 
authoritarianism), and occasionally as strong groupness (belonging and authoritarianism); (3) 
religious dimensions, additively to and interactively with, authoritarianism and low existential 
quest predict interreligious prejudice (in monotheistic cultures); and (4) anti-Muslim attitudes 
were the highest, but fundamentalism and religiousness related most strongly to anti-atheist 
sentiments. 
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Abstract 
Is fundamentalism universal across religious cultures? We investigated this issue by focusing 
on three questions: (1) the dimensionality of fundamentalism, as measured by the Religious 
Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004); (2) the very nature of 
fundamentalism as denoting dogmatic belief, moral rigorism, or strong groupness; and (3) 
interreligious prejudice as predicted uniquely, additively, or interactively by religiousness and 
socio-cognitive rigidity. We collected data from 14 countries of Catholic, Protestant, Christian 
Orthodox, Buddhist, Jewish, and Muslim tradition, regrouped in seven cultural-religious 
zones (N = 3,218 young adults). We measured fundamentalism, the four dimensions of 
religiousness (believing, bonding, behaving, and belonging), authoritarianism, existential 
quest, and interreligious prejudice—negative and discriminatory attitudes toward various 
religious outgroups and atheists. Across religious cultures, we found that: (1) the scale is 
unidimensional; (2) fundamentalism is best conceptualized as a combination of dogmatic 
belief (believing and low existential quest) and moral rigorism (behaving and 
authoritarianism), and occasionally as strong groupness (belonging and authoritarianism); (3) 
religious dimensions, additively to and interactively with, authoritarianism and low existential 
quest predict interreligious prejudice (in monotheistic cultures); and (4) anti-Muslim attitudes 
were the highest, but fundamentalism and religiousness related most strongly to anti-atheist 
sentiments. 
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Fundamentalism as Dogmatic Belief, Moral Rigorism, and Strong Groupness across Cultures: 
Dimensionality, Underlying Components, and Related Interreligious Prejudice 
What is the very nature of religious fundamentalism, from an individual differences 
perspective? In psychology, fundamentalism has been primarily conceptualized either as (1) 
dogmatic and rigid belief and conviction (Kirkpatrick et al., 1991) or as (2) authoritarian 
religion (Altemeyer, 1996). The latter can be declined into (2a) religious moral traditionalism 
and rigorism (Antonenko Young et al., 2013; Johnson et all., 2016) and/or (2b) strong and 
exclusivist identification with the religious group (Herriot, 2007; Hogg et al., 2010). This 
means that fundamentalism may involve three dimensions of the four Bs model of religious 
multidimensionality (Saroglou, 2011), believing (cognitive), behaving (moral), and belonging 
(groupness aspect), as well as rigid socio-cognitive orientations of traditionalism and 
submission to norms and authority and/or dogmatism, absolutism, and inflexibility in beliefs 
and conviction. However, it is unclear whether the different aspects of fundamentalism 
(entirely) overlap or whether they are unique contributors to religious fundamentalism. 
To the best of our knowledge, this integrated conceptualization of fundamentalism as a 
multicomponent construct has not yet been theorized and empirically investigated. More 
importantly, there has not been systematic investigation of the very nature of fundamentalism 
across different religious cultures, including secular and religious countries of Christian 
tradition (Catholic, Protestant, Christian Orthodox), countries of other monotheistic traditions 
(Jewish and Muslim), and countries of East Asian religious traditions (Buddhism and 
Taoism). Furthermore, no such cross-cultural investigation has been carried out using the 
integrative framework of the religious dimensions and the socio-cognitive orientations we 
described above. This investigation is the central aim of the present research.  
We investigated these questions in 14 countries, with adult samples from Europe, the 
Americas, the Middle East, and Asia, organized into seven cultural-religious zones, partly 
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following Inglehart and Welzel’s (2013) world map of civilizational zones. These zones were: 
secular Western European countries (Catholic or mixed Catholic/Protestant heritage), 
religious Catholic countries, the US (predominantly Protestant tradition), Greece (Christian 
Orthodox), Israel (Jewish), Turkey (Muslim), and Taiwan (Buddhist/Taoist tradition). 
In addition to the central question regarding the nature of religious fundamentalism 
across various religious cultures, we investigated two other related questions. The first regards 
the dimensionality of fundamentalism as measured by Altemeyer & Hunsberger’s (2004) 
classic scale: is the construct unidimensional or multi-dimensional across cultures? The 
second regards interreligious prejudice, a typical outcome of fundamentalism (Rowatt et al., 
2013). Assuming that fundamentalism is a combination of religious dimensions with rigid 
socio-cognitive orientations, we investigated whether these components relate to and predict, 
across religious cultures, interreligious prejudice, uniquely, additively, and/or interactively. 
We provide the rationale and the specific hypotheses for each of the three questions below. 
Unidimensionality and Cross-Cultural Equivalence of Fundamentalism 
Is fundamentalism a unidimensional construct? In the classic Fundamentalism Project 
(Marty & Appleby, 1995), specific aspects of fundamentalism, from a sociological and 
interdisciplinary perspective, were enumerated. These included absolutism and infallibility of 
religious texts or authorities, authoritarian structure of the group, feeling of being “selected”, 
anti-modernism and anti-secularism, moral dualism, and apocalyptic tendencies. From a 
psychological perspective, one may consider different expressions of fundamentalism 
translating cognitive inflexibility, emotional negativity, moral rigorism, and/or an 
authoritarian social structure (Saroglou, 2016). Moreover, in the widely used Religious 
Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004), purportedly unidimensional, one 
can identify potentially distinct elements: (1) the superiority and exclusiveness of one’s 
religious teachings as containing the fundamental truth about humans and god and which must 
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be strictly followed, (2) moral dualism and the need to fight evil, and (3) opposition to science 
and historical relativism in interpreting sacred texts and religious ideas.  
Beyond or across these nuanced aspects, it is reasonable to expect religious 
fundamentalism to also reflect a unified global attitude of absolutism of one’s religion. This 
absolutism might encompass religious beliefs, rituals, norms, and community, and across 
related domains such as rationality, science, history, morality, and society’s ideals. We 
expected fundamentalism, as in Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s scale, to be unidimensional 
because first religiosity is already known to be integrative of cognitive, emotional, moral, and 
social aspects into a coherent whole (Hinde, 2009; Saroglou, 2011). Second, fundamentalism 
intensifies this integrative tendency since, as theorized by Rokeach (1960), dogmatism 
implies the subordination of all other “peripheral” beliefs to the “central” (i.e. religious) belief 
system. In a previous investigation of the dimensionality of the Religious Fundamentalism 
Scale in Germany, Romania, and the US (Krauss et al., 2006), no theoretically distinct factors 
were found; the two factor solution was comprised of only the pro- versus the con-items (see 
also for similar results in Italy with an older scale: Carlucci et al., 2013).  
We investigated the dimensionality of fundamentalism collecting data from a number 
of countries representing all major world religions except Hinduism. For the reasons 
presented above, we expected fundamentalism, as measured with the Religious 
Fundamentalism Scale, to be unidimensional across cultural contexts (Hypothesis 1).  
Fundamentalism as Dogmatic Belief, Moral Rigorism, and/or Strong Groupness 
Identifying the psychological components of fundamentalism is an issue partly 
different from fundamentalism’s uni-dimensionality. Does fundamentalism primarily denote 
religious dogmatic belief, moral rigorism, or strong groupness? Are these three aspects 
overlapping, complementary, and/or all necessary to constitute fundamentalism? Previous 
research suggests that fundamentalism is a combination of religiousness and closed-
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mindedness in socio-cognitive orientations, mainly authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996; 
Rowatt et al., 2013). However, the more specific integrative model we propose has not yet 
been investigated, and certainly not across different religious cultures. We hypothesized 
fundamentalism to denote all three components, i.e. dogmatic belief, moral rigorism, and 
strong groupness (Hypotheses 2a-2c), and we investigated whether these three partly overlap 
and/or are partly unique in predicting fundamentalism across religious cultures. It may also be 
that, in certain cultures, fundamentalism becomes more dogmatic, more moralistic, or more 
identitarian (Saroglou, 2016). Below are the three rationales and the respective hypotheses. 
Dogmatic Belief 
Fundamentalism may primarily involve dogmatic belief. This means strong conviction 
in beliefs and worldviews ignoring non-supportive evidence (Kirkpatrick et al., 1991), 
subordination of ideas and peripheral beliefs to a central belief system (Rokeach, 1960), 
exclusion of doubt and non-openness to the possibility of change (Batson et al., 1993), and 
literalism/orthodoxy, i.e. an interpretation of religious ideas that is unilateral (Fontaine et al., 
2003) and intra-textual, excluding external sources (Hood et al., 2005). Of importance, 
religious dogmatic belief is not necessarily coupled with traditionalism, since it can be 
observed not only in traditional religious systems, but also in liberal religious ideologies.  
We expected religious fundamentalism to involve, across religious cultures, religious 
dogmatic belief (Hypothesis 2a). To investigate this, we examined the associations of 
fundamentalism with (1) the believing religious dimension and (2) low existential quest. The 
former implies attachment to religious belief that provides meaning and purpose in life 
(Saroglou, 2011). The latter denotes not valuing doubt and not being open to the possibility of 
changing one’s own ideas and beliefs about the existential issues (Van Pachterbeke et al., 
2012). Research in the US and Western Europe has showed that religious fundamentalism and 
literalism include a component of cognitive rigidity: they are related to dogmatism 
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(Altemeyer, 1996), need for closure (Brandt & Renya, 2010; Duriez, 2003), and need for 
consistency (Hill et al., 2010).  
Moral Rigorism 
Fundamentalism has also be conceptualized as religious authoritarianism, with the 
emphasis being on moral and social conservatism, colored by submission to the authorities 
(Altemeyer, 1996) and a need for righteousness, purity, and preservation of moral order 
(Saroglou, 2019). Thus, it denotes anti-modernism and opposition to secularism and liberal 
values. It is positively related to authoritarianism (Rowatt et al., 2013), political conservatism 
(Ludeke et al., 2013), traditional gender roles (Schnabel, 2016), and collectivistic moral 
foundations of authority and purity (Johnson et al., 2016). Again, religious moral rigorism and 
traditionalism are not entirely equivalent to dogmatism: some religious people may be 
submissive moral conservatives without dogmatically endorsing a belief system. 
We hypothesized that religious fundamentalism reflects, across cultures, religious 
moral rigorism (Hypothesis 2b). To investigate this, we examined fundamentalism’s 
associations with (1) the behaving—morally/righteously—religious dimension, i.e. 
attachment to religion for the moral guidance it offers (Saroglou, 2011) and (2) right-wing 
authoritarianism, which denotes moral and societal conservatism. We expected the 
associations to be consistent and robust across cultures, given the high similarities, across 
religious cultures, in traditional morality, in particular the “hygienic” morality focusing on 
sexuality and family-related values (Saroglou, 2019).  
Strong Groupness 
A third way to conceptualize fundamentalism is in terms of strong religious group 
identification (Herriot, 2007). Again, fundamentalists might be moderate or even weak 
believers and practitioners and yet strong identifiers with the religious group or heritage. 
Strong groupness implies heightened ingroup barriers, pervasive strong “us” versus “them” 
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distinction, and actions to get or maintain control of symbolic and real resources, especially in 
a competitive context (Hogg et al., 2010; Ysseldyk et al., 2010). Such strong religious 
groupness implies submission to (religious) authority, be it for moral, prosocial, or immoral, 
antisocial, objectives (Blogowska & Saroglou, 2013; Rothschild et al., 2009). 
We thus hypothesized fundamentalism to be associated, across cultures, with a strong 
identification with one’snreligious tradition (Hypothesis 2c). To investigated this, we 
examined fundamentalism’s association with (1) the religious dimension of belonging to a 
community and being attached to a religious tradition and heritage (Saroglou, 2011), and (2) 
authoritarianism, which denotes attachment to group authorities and norms. 
Religious and Socio-Cognitive Components as Underlying Interreligious Prejudice 
If fundamentalism can be conceptualized and found, as expected here, as a 
combination of religious dimensions (i.e., believing, behaving, and belonging) along with 
with closed-minded socio-cognitive personal orientations, then fundamentalism’s well-known 
effect on prejudice (Rowatt et al., 2013) can also be conceptualized as reflecting the combined 
role of religiousness with authoritarianism and rigid thinking in predicting prejudice.  
We thus investigated whether religiousness, across its four dimensions (Saroglou, 
2011)—including bonding (emotional aspects of religion)—is associated with and predicts 
interreligious prejudice, operationalized here as social distance and discriminatory attitudes 
toward religious outgroups. We investigated whether religiousness does so uniquely—
independently from and additively to—and/or interactively with, authoritarianism and (low) 
existential quest. We hypothesized both kinds of effects, with religiousness predicting 
interreligious prejudice both additively to authoritarianism and (low) existential quest 
(Hypothesis 3a), and in interaction with these two constructs (Hypothesis 3b). Finally, we 
hypothesized the combined role of religiousness with authoritarianism and low existential 
quest in predicting interreligious prejudice to be found across various religious cultures 
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(Hypothesis 3c). This was expected at least within cultures of monotheistic tradition where 
there is a clear connection between religiousness on the one hand and search for order, self-
control, and intolerance of contradiction on the other hand (Clobert et al., 2017; Stark, 2001).  
Secondarily, this investigation allows us to clarify whether it is only sociomoral 
conservatism (authoritarianism) or also, additively and uniquely, low cognitive/convictional 
flexibility (low existential quest) that predicts prejudice. Both authoritarianism (Rowatt et al., 
2013) and low cognitive flexibility (need for closure, need for consistency: Brandt & Renya, 
2010; Hill et al., 2010) have been found to explain religious prejudice. 
Regarding religiousness, we expected the three dimensions (believing, behaving, and 
belonging) hypothesized to underline fundamentalism to also predict interreligious 
prejudice—additively to authoritarianism and (low) existential quest (Hypothesis 4). 
Religionists of other religions may be perceived as ideological outgroups threatening one’s 
own beliefs and worldviews, as moral outgroups threatening one’s own values and norms, and 
as social outgroups, competing with one’s religious group for real and symbolic resources 
(Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Ysseldyk et al., 2010). 
To investigate our hypotheses, we included a series of groups as targets of prejudicial 
attitudes. These groups included atheists (outgroup in all countries), Buddhists (outgroup in 
all cultures of monotheistic traditions), Muslims (outgroup in all countries except Turkey in 
this study), Jews (outgroup in all countries except Israel), and Catholics (outgroup in countries 
of predominantly non-Christian religious tradition). We expected the association between 
fundamentalism and prejudice to be stronger regarding atheists compared with the other 
religious outgroups (Hypothesis 5a). Atheists may be seen as combining all three evaluative 
dimensions: an opposite ideology, conflicting values, and social competition.  
Finally, research suggests that specific religious prejudices are moderated by whether 
these prejudices are socially/religiously proscribed or not (Batson et al., 1993; Hall et al., 
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2010). Accordingly, we anticipated the association between fundamentalism and 
interreligious prejudice to be weaker or non-existent in cultural contexts where such prejudice 
is formally proscribed or at least not encouraged (Hypothesis 5b).  
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were students in the humanities and social sciences from 14 countries who 
took part voluntarily in the study (total N = 3,218; Mage = 21.82, SD = 4.95, 70.8% female). 
The countries included were Belgium (BE), Costa Rica (CR), France (FR), Germany (DE), 
Greece (GR), Israel (IL), Italy (IT), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK), Spain (ES), Switzerland 
(CH), USA (Arizona and Indiana), Turkey (TK), and Taiwan (TW). Following the general 
recommendations regarding the sample size requirements for CFAs (Wolf et al., 2013), and 
the sample size requirements for SEM (Kline, 2015), we estimated that a sample size of 150-
200 participants per country was necessary to obtain statistical power at the recommended .80 
level (Cohen, 1988). Data were collected during 2010-2012 (in Italy, in 2016) and were part 
of a larger study (AUTHOR), which additionally included measures of personality (big five), 
need for closure, life satisfaction, the PANAS, and a projective measure of myside bias. No 
other measures were included, and participants were not assigned to experimental conditions. 
In line with previous work (Inglehart & Welzel, 2011; AUTHOR), we distinguished 
seven religious-cultural zones for the analyses: secular Western European countries (BE, FR, 
DE, ES, CH; all of Catholic or mixed Protestant-Catholic tradition; N = 1,204), religious 
Catholic countries (CR, IT, PL, SK; N = 757), USA (predominantly Protestant tradition; N = 
412), Greece (Christian Orthodox tradition; N = 163), Israel (Jewish tradition; N = 147), 
Turkey (Muslim tradition; N = 250), and Taiwan (Eastern Asian religious traditions: N = 236). 
Given the focus on interreligious prejudice, we excluded the very few religious participants in 
each country who were not affiliated with that country’s major religious tradition. 
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Measures 
Religious Fundamentalism and Religiousness 
The 12-item Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 
2004) was used to assess religious fundamentalism (e.g., ‘‘God has given humanity a 
complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed’’; 7-
point Likert scales). The measure has been widely used, across religions and cultures (α’s in 
our data ranged from .75 to .95 across countries and cultural zones). 
Participants also completed the Four Basic Dimensions of Religiousness scale 
(Saroglou et al., 2020). Following previous theorization (Saroglou, 2011), this 12-item 7-point 
Likert scale measures the cognitive, emotional, moral, and social dimensions of religiousness. 
Specifically, it measures positive attitudes toward and importance of: (1) religious meaning 
and belief, i.e. the Believing dimension (α’s ranging from .77 to .91 across countries); (2) 
religious ritual and emotions, i.e. the Bonding dimension (α’s ranging from .73 to .94); (3) 
religious morality, i.e. the Behaving dimension (α’s ranging from .79 to .95); and (4) religious 
community and tradition, i.e. the Belonging dimension (α’s ranging from .71 to .92). Sample 
items are: “Religious beliefs have important implications for our understanding of human 
existence” (believing); “Religious rituals, activities or practices make me feel positive 
emotion” (bonding); “I am attached to the religion for the values and ethics it endorses” 
(behaving); and “In religion, I enjoy belonging to a group/community” (belonging).  
Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Existential Quest 
We administered 12 items from the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (Funke’s, 
2005). Following Altemeyer (1996), this version comprises items assessing three dimensions 
of authoritarianism: conventionalism, submission, and aggression (α’s ranged from .52 to .73 
across countries). We also administered the 9-item Existential Quest scale (Van Pachterbeke 
et al., 2012) measuring flexibility in existential beliefs and worldviews—specifically, valuing 
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doubt and being open to questioning and changing one’s own existential beliefs and 
worldviews (7-point Likert scales). Sample items are, “In my opinion, doubt is important in 
existential questions” and “My way of seeing the world is certainly going to change again” 
(α’s ranged from .64 to .82 across countries.) 
Interreligious Prejudice 
We measured prejudice as social distance and negative and discriminatory attitudes 
toward atheists, Buddhists, Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and members of “Yxto” (a fictitious 
religious group). For each of these targets, we used four questions: “Would you like to have 
[target] as (1) a neighbor, (2) a political representative, and (3) a husband/wife?” (answers 
varying from 1 = totally dislike to 7 = totally like) and (4) “How different are you from 
[target]?” (answers varying from 1 = very the same to 7 = very different). These measures are 
used in large international surveys to measure prejudice more subtly. They are less explicit 
than other measures (e.g., the liking thermometer), clearly denote discriminatory tendencies 
(e.g., refusing to rent an apartment to people because of their religion is a crime in several 
countries), and allow for the collection of information regarding numerous outgroups using 
easy-to-administer paper and pencil measures. The scores were reversed and aggregated by 
target (αs across countries for atheists, .74-.87; Buddhists, .63-.85; Catholics, .68-.86; Jews, 
.68-.81; Muslims, .70-.86; and Yxtos, .68-.84). An overall score of interreligious prejudice 
was also computed by religious-cultural zone, by first excluding responses regarding the 
relevant ingroups (Buddhists in Taiwan, Jews in Israel, Muslims in Turkey, and Catholics in 
the remaining cultures) and then by aggregating the scores for all the prejudice measures. 
Results 
(Uni)Factorial Structure and Cross-Cultural Equivalence of the Fundamentalism Scale 
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) specifying a single-factor model with all the 
items of the scale contributing to a single underlying factor (religious fundamentalism) was 
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conducted using AMOS, version 20. Parameters were estimated using maximum likelihood. 
To account for the nested structure of the data, we ran a multi-group CFA (unconstrained 
model). The one-factor model, χ2(810, N = 3218) = 2674.548, presented a modest (CFI = 
.868, IFI = .871, NFI = .825) or good (RMSEA = .027) fit to the data, according to the usual 
indices. To ensure that the single-factor model was equivalent across the 14 countries and 
individuals’ religious affiliations, multi-group CFAs were conducted. We compared a model 
with no measurement equivalence constraints across countries versus three constraint models. 
In the first model (configural and metric invariance), factor loadings were constrained to be 
equal across countries. The second model (scalar invariance) required the factor loadings and 
intercepts to be equal across countries. In the third model (strict invariance), items’ factor 
loadings, intercepts, and variances were constrained to be equal across countries. Change in 
goodness of fit was used as an indicator of measurement equivalence.  
Following Cheung and Rensvold (2002), we used ΔRMSEA (less than or equal to .01) 
as an indicator of measurement equivalence, and as our principal indicator since all other 
Goodness of Fit Indices were found to be at least partially dependent on model complexity 
(e.g., number of manifest variables). The RMSEA of the unconstrained model was .027, 
whereas the first and second constraint models presented RMSEA of .028 and .037, 
respectively (ΔRMSEAs ≤ .01). Using this criterion, we, therefore, established configural, 
metric, and scalar invariance, indicating that the fundamentalism scale is a unidimensional 
measure across countries. Thus, mean comparisons, correlations, and regression analyses can 
be confidently conducted across countries (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). Nevertheless, 
strict invariance was not established since the last constraint model presented an RMSEA of 
.040 (ΔRMSEA = .013), which is slightly above the threshold of .01.  
In exploratory factor analyses for each religious-cultural zone, specifying two factors 
and varimax rotation, we found that the two factors typically included the six positive versus 
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the six reverse-scored items. When specifying three factors, the positive versus reverse-scored 
items remained predominant, and the third factor consisted of only one or two items. When 
specifying four factors, the factors were neither theoretically meaningful nor consistent across 
cultures. The only exception regarding the meaningfulness of the four-factor model was 
Israel. In Israel, the four factors were religious absolutism, i.e., strict adoption of the only one 
true religion’s teachings (items 1, 5, 8, and 11), religious literalism, where sacred texts are 
entirely true and not subject to historicocritical relativization (items 2, 7, 10, and 12), 
religious moralism, i.e., religion is the only true morality (items 4 and 6), and religious 
“conspiracy” (Satan is fighting against us and God: items 3 and 9). These factors 
approximate the distinction between identitarian, literalistic, moralistic, and negative 
emotionality-fueled forms of fundamentalism (Saroglou, 2016).  
Fundamentalism Predicted by Religious Dimensions and Socio-Cognitive Orientations 
Correlations 
Correlations of religious fundamentalism with the four religious dimensions and the 
two socio-cognitive orientations (authoritarianism and existential quest), by religious-cultural 
zone, are detailed in Table 2. All four religious dimensions were positively related to 
fundamentalism in all cultures, with only one exception, the bonding dimension in Taiwan. 
Repeating the same analyses for religionists only—thus, not retaining atheists, agnostics, and 
“other”—provided similar results. Finally, fundamentalism was related to authoritarianism 
and low existential quest, and this was the case across all seven religious-cultural zones. 
Again, repeating the same analyses only among religionists provided similar results. 
Multiple Regression Analyses 
In the next step, we conducted a multiple regression analysis of fundamentalism, with 
the four religious dimensions, authoritarianism, and existential quest as predictors, distinctly 
by religious-cultural zone (see Table 3). In all cultures, fundamentalism was predicted 
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uniquely by both high authoritarianism and low existential quest. However, above and beyond 
these psychological constructs, fundamentalism was predicted in all cultures uniquely and 
additively by two or three of the religious dimensions. These included (1) believing, in all but 
one cultural zone (only in Greece the positive effect was non-significant), (2) behaving, in all 
but two cultural zones (religious Catholic countries and Taiwan), and (3) belonging, in secular 
European countries, the US (marginally significant), Greece, and Taiwan. Bonding predicted 
fundamentalism only in the religious Catholic countries.  
The models explained an important amount of variance, i.e. from 42% to 74% across 
monotheistic cultural zones—but explained only 18% in Taiwan. Adding age and gender as 
predictors in the regression analyses did not change the significant findings for any culture. 
Repeating the same analyses only among religionists (see also Table 3) provided the same 
significant results across cultures, for the religious dimensions of believing and behaving, 
authoritarianism, and existential quest. However, the bonding dimension was no longer a 
significant predictor of fundamentalism in the religious Catholic countries, and the belonging 
dimension was no longer a significant predictor in any cultural zone except in Taiwan. 
Subsequently, we investigated in a last multiple regression analysis the interaction 
effects. We regressed fundamentalism on the above four religious dimensions, 
authoritarianism, and existential quest, and added as predictors the interactions of 
religiousness (the aggregate score of the four dimensions) with authoritarianism and with 
existential quest. We also included as predictor the three-way interaction between 
religiousness, authoritarianism, and existential quest. Given the number of predictors (ten), we 
carried out this multiple regression analysis in the total sample, and then repeated the analysis 
only among religionists (see Table 4). 
We found that fundamentalism was predicted, uniquely and additively, by both the 
behaving and the believing dimensions, as well as by high authoritarianism and low 
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existential quest. The results were the same in the subsample of religionists only. In addition 
to the religious and the socio-cognitive dimensions, the interaction of religiousness with (low) 
existential quest, as well as the 3-way interaction, were significant in predicting 
fundamentalism. All the predictors taken together explained about 60% of the variance of 
religious fundamentalism. The results remained similar after adding gender and age, which 
were not significant predictors. To account for the nested structure of the data, we also 
conducted a mixed-model analysis, including the random effect of country (random intercept 
and slopes). All the predictors of fundamentalism shown in Table 4 remained significant. 
To further understand the effect of the 3-way interaction, we divided the total sample 
into high (above the median) and low (below the median) authoritarians and investigated the 
effect of the interaction between religiousness and existential quest on fundamentalism. We 
found the interaction to be significant among the high authoritarians, B = -.34, t(1,1640) = -
14.52, p < .001, but inexistent among the low authoritarians, B = .00, t(1,1514) = 0.08. Figure 
1 depicts the combined role of religiousness and (low) existential quest in predicting 
fundamentalism among the low and the high authoritarians.  
Interreligious Prejudice as Predicted by the Components of Fundamentalism 
Correlations 
Table 5 details the correlations, distinctly by religious-cultural zone, between religious 
fundamentalism, religiousness (aggregate score of the four dimensions), authoritarianism, and 
existential quest, and prejudice toward atheists and Yxtos (out-groups in all zones), Buddhists 
(outgroup in all zones except Taiwan), Jews (outgroup in all zones except Israel), Muslims 
(outgroup in all zones except Turkey), and Catholics (ingroup in countries of Christian 
tradition and outgroup in Israel, Taiwan, Turkey). 
Authoritarianism was positively and most strongly related, and existential quest was 
negatively related, consistently across outgroups and cultures, to interreligious prejudice. 
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Only three out of the 58 correlations were not significant, the negative association between 
existential quest and interreligious prejudice toward Catholics and Muslims in Israel, and 
toward Jews in the religious Catholic cultures.  
Moreover, in all cultural zones (except Taiwan, see below), fundamentalism and 
religiousness were consistently associated with negative attitudes toward atheists, Buddhists, 
and the fictitious “Yxtos” (for the latter, except in secular Western Europe). Similarly, in the 
East Mediterranean countries, fundamentalism and religiousness were related to negative 
attitudes toward the monotheistic outgroups: Jews and Muslims for Greece (one of the four 
associations was not significant), Catholics and Muslims for Israel, and Catholics and Jews 
for Turkey. The religious attitudes of Greek Orthodox toward Catholics were neither positive 
nor negative (Catholics may not be perceived as a religious ingroup in this country). 
Among cultures with Western Christian heritage (Catholicism and Protestantism), the 
attitudes toward monotheistic outgroups were less homogeneous. In secular Western 
European countries, fundamentalism and religiousness were unrelated to anti-Jew and anti-
Muslim sentiments; in religious Catholic countries, fundamentalism and religiousness were 
unrelated to anti-Jew sentiments but related to anti-Muslim ones; and in the US, only 
fundamentalism was related to anti-Jew and anti-Muslim attitudes, but religiousness was 
either unrelated (anti-Muslim) or related to positive sentiments toward Jews.  
Taiwan was an exceptional case. Authoritarianism and existential quest were unrelated 
to prejudice; and religiousness was related to negative attitudes only toward atheists and 
positive attitudes toward other religionists, i.e. Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and even “Yxtos”.  
Prejudices Varying in Importance 
In all cultures, the association of fundamentalism with prejudice was the highest 
toward atheists compared to the other targets (Table 5). Negative attitudes toward atheists 
were higher compared to the ones regarding Buddhists, in secular Western Europe, the US, 
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Greece, Israel, and Turkey, respective z’s = 4.49, 5.21, 3.58, 3.03, and 3.93, all ps < .001. 
Moreover, prejudice toward Buddhists as a function of fundamentalism was higher than 
prejudice toward: Jews and Muslims, in secular Western Europe, religious Catholic countries, 
and the US, respective z’s = 6.16, 5.42, 6.62, all p’s < .001; Muslims and Catholics in Greece, 
1.57, p = .058; Jews and Catholics in Turkey, 1.49, p = .068; and Muslims in Israel, 1.82, p = 
.034. The only two exceptions were the anti-Jew attitudes in Greece and the anti-Catholic 
attitudes in Israel whose associations with fundamentalism were equal to or slightly higher 
than the association of fundamentalism with the anti-Buddhist attitudes.  
Note that this implicit hierarchy of interreligious prejudice as a function of 
fundamentalism, with atheists being the most disliked, was different from the evident 
hierarchy between targets when simply comparing means in the general population (see Table 
1), where anti-Muslim sentiments were the highest in all relevant cultures. When comparing 
the means of the various prejudices within each cultural zone (see Table 1), thus 
independently from fundamentalism, we found that anti-Muslim attitudes—often followed by 
the negative attitudes toward the fictitious group—were the highest in all relevant cultural 
zones. Negative sentiments toward Muslims were stronger compared to Buddhists and Jews in 
secular Western Europe, religious Catholic countries, the US, and Greece, Fs = 508.81, 
353.26, 157.51, and 20.87, respectively (dfs: 1123, 748, 399, 156; 1); Buddhists and 
Catholics, F(140, 1) = 126.43, in Israel; and Jews and Catholics, F(218, 1) = 54.41, in Taiwan 
(all ps < .001). Attitudes against atheists were the lowest in most cultures, compared to: 
Buddhists and Jews, in secular Western Europe, religious Catholic countries, and Greece, 
respective Fs = 296.48, 11.65, and 11.41 (dfs: 1,123, 748, 156; 1); Buddhists and Catholics in 
Israel, F(140, 1) = 29.30; and Jews and Catholics in Taiwan, F(218, 1) = 60.76 (all ps < .001); 
but were higher compared to Buddhists and Jews in the US, F(399, 1) = 57.30, p < .001, and 
Jews and Catholics in Turkey, F(249, 1) = 6.22, p = .013. 
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Intercorrelations Between Prejudices 
The various prejudices were inter-correlated in all cultural zones, with ranges varying 
as follows: r’s = .22 to .68, in secular Western European countries (Catholics not included, 
but with associations going in the same direction—an indicator of treating all religions 
similarly); r’s = .32 to .71, in religious Catholic countries (Catholics not included, and with 
associations going to the opposite direction); r’s = .38 to .75 (USA, Catholics not included, 
but with associations going to the same direction—an indicator of treating all religions 
similarly); r’s = .35 to .74, in Greece (Catholics not included, but with associations going to 
the same direction—an indicator that Catholics were a sort of outgroup); r’s = .26 to .61, in 
Israel (Jews not included, but with associations going to the opposite direction); r’s = .53 to 
.75 in Turkey (Muslims not included but with associations going to the opposite direction); 
and r’s = .43 to .82 in Taiwan (Buddhists not included, but with associations going in the 
same direction—an indicator of treating all religions similarly) with attitudes toward atheists 
going in the opposite direction. 
Given the above intercorrelations between attitudes toward the various outgroups, we 
created for each cultural zone a global measure of religious prejudice, by aggregating the 
attitudes toward the relevant zone’s outgroups: atheists, Yxtos, and all the religious groups 
except the zone’s ingroup (i.e., Catholics for countries of Christian tradition, Buddhists for 
Taiwan, Jews for Israel, and Muslims for Turkey). 
Multiple Regression Analyses 
To identify the unique and additional effect of fundamentalism’s components on 
interreligious prejudice (as an aggregate score), we first conducted two series of multiple 
regressions, distinctly by cultural zone (see Table 6). Taiwan was not included since overall 
religiousness did not predict interreligious prejudice. In the first series, we regressed 
interreligious prejudice on the four religious dimensions (Model 1). In the second series, we 
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regressed interreligious prejudice on general religiousness (the aggregate score of the four 
dimensions), authoritarianism, and existential quest (Model 2).  
In three cultural zones, the US, Israel, and Turkey, interreligious prejudice was 
predicted by the religious behaving (moral) dimension. In addition, interreligious prejudice 
was predicted by the believing dimension in the religious Catholic countries, the bonding 
dimension in Greece, and the belonging dimension in the secular West. The variance 
explained was low in Western countries with a Christian tradition, and moderate in the other 
cultures (Model 1). When both the socio-cognitive orientations and religiousness were entered 
as predictors (Model 2), interreligious prejudice was predicted, in all zones by 
authoritarianism, but also (low) existential quest. In addition, in all but two cultural zones, 
religiousness had a unique effect on interreligious prejudice, above and beyond socio-
cognitive orientations. However, this was not the case in the two cultural zones characterized 
by secularism or Protestantism (Europe and the US). The total variance explained was higher 
in the second model compared to the model with religious dimensions alone. 
Finally, we carried out a multiple regression analysis using the total sample. We 
regressed interreligious prejudice on religiousness (aggregate), authoritarianism, existential 
quest, the interactions of religiousness with authoritarianism and with existential quest, and 
the 3-way interaction between the three constructs (Table 7). The three constructs and the 
two-way interactions had unique and additive effects in predicting prejudice (Figure 2). 
Repeating the same analysis among religionists confirmed the unique role of religiousness, 
authoritarianism, and (low) existential quest; however, the interactions were no longer 
significant. Adding gender and age as predictors slightly increased the explained variance, 
from 17% to 18% for the total sample, and from .14% to .16% for the religionist subsample, 
but did not change the significant results (women and younger participants scored slightly 
higher in interreligious prejudice). Nevertheless, in a subsequent multi-level, mixed model, 
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including the random effect of country (random intercept and slopes), authoritarianism was 
the only significant predictor of interreligious prejudice. 
Discussion 
With data from 14 countries, mostly from Europe, but also the Americas, Middle East, 
and East Asia, organized into seven religious-cultural zones and reflecting most major world 
religious traditions (Protestantism, Catholicism, secular Christianity, Orthodox Christianity, 
Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism/Taoism), we provided evidence advancing our understanding 
of the very nature of religious fundamentalism and related interreligious prejudice.  
Fundamentalism’s Unidimensionality  
Across the various religious-cultural zones, fundamentalism, as measured by the 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (2004) scale, was shown to be unidimensional, in line with 
previous research (Krauss et al., 2006). The scale’s unidimensionality is not incompatible 
with the possibility that a researcher might find distinct aspects of fundamentalism within the 
same scale or by using a different measure, or in specific cultural contexts. In our Israeli 
sample, for example, an exploratory factor analysis indicated four factors denoting religious 
absolutism, literalism, moralism, and conspiracy—fear of the evil’s action.  
Nevertheless, the data confirmed the unidimensional nature of the construct denoting 
the unifying character of the fundamentalist attitude. Based on the items included in 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (2004) scale, we can define this unifying fundamentalist attitude 
as strict adherence to religion as the exclusive source of truth about god and humans and of 
guidance for behavior, even if in conflict with science, history, and morality. 
Fundamentalism as Dogmatic Belief, Moral Rigorism, and, Possibly, Strong Groupness 
It has been assumed that fundamentalism is all about a personal authoritarian structure 
(Altemeyer, 1996), with religiousness having little or nothing to add; or that fundamentalism 
is dogmatism (Kirkpatrick et al., 1991) applied to a particular ideology (religion). It has also 
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been argued that closed-mindedness is orthogonal to religiosity (Fontaine et al., 2005) or even 
to fundamentalism (Hood et al., 2005). A complementary consideration is that 
fundamentalism represents the subcategory of those religious people who are authoritarian 
and/or dogmatic (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). Finally, it is unclear whether fundamentalism 
is similar or different across religions and/or cultures (Saroglou, 2016). 
The present research provides answers to the above issues, with evidence being that 
fundamentalism is consistent across cultures. In all seven religious cultures, fundamentalism 
was predicted not only by authoritarianism but also, uniquely and additively, by (low) 
existential quest and by religiousness. When focusing on the four religious dimensions, it was 
the believing (belief in transcendence and meaning in life) and the behaving (morally) 
dimensions that typically predicted fundamentalism across cultures. 
Taken together, these findings imply that fundamentalism involves cognitive and 
moral rigidity, a combination of dogmatic, inflexible, belief (believing and low existential 
quest) with moral rigorism and conservatism through conformity to religious norms (behaving 
and authoritarianism). In other words, fundamentalism integrates religious authoritarianism 
and religious dogmatism, or orthodoxy and orthopraxy.  
Religious authoritarianism and religious dogmatism are partly distinct. Some religious 
zealots may be conservative, rigorist, and submissive without dogmatically endorsing a belief 
system and worldviews; others may be dogmatic in their convictions without being 
authoritarian and even with being liberal. However, the two, religious dogmatism and 
authoritarianism, are also related, if we observe the correlations between believing and 
behaving (varying across cultures from .72 to .83, among the religionists) and between 
authoritarianism and existential quest (from -.19 to -.39). We argue that religious absolutism 
may be appealing and strong because what is true to believe is also good to do (and vice 
versa) because this is what the tradition and the group’s authority have endorsed as good to 
FUNDAMENTALISM ACROSS CULTURES                                                                        23 
 
follow and true to believe for centuries. Moreover, as suggested by a reviewer, the believing 
and behaving dimensions may be highly demanding of strictness: they imply, respectively, 
strong adherence to many counterintuitive ideas and exercising extensive self-control in 
reference to many norms (Hansen & Ryder, 2016).  
The belonging religious dimension (attachment to the religious group and tradition), 
combined with authoritarianism, can be characterized as reflecting strong religious groupness. 
The latter uniquely explained fundamentalism in Greece, where Orthodox Christianity and 
ethnicity are known to be highly interconnected (Ramet, 2019), in secular Europe, where the 
transition from uni-religious to multi-convictional societies created some cultural valorization 
of religious heritage (Astor et al., 2017; Kasselstrand, 2015), and in Taiwan, possibly because 
in cultures of long historical co-existence between various religious traditions, strongly 
identifying with one of them may denote religious superiority and rigidity. However, we note 
that the belonging dimension explained additional variance of fundamentalism in samples 
including believers and non-believers, but not in subsamples composed by only religionists. 
Strong religious groupness may characterize zealots who seek to defend ethnoreligious 
cultural purity compared to the “globalizing” atheists, without necessarily being high 
believers or practitioners. 
Religious fundamentalism appears as a strong and possibly unique kind of absolutism 
involving dogmatic belief, moral rigorism, and, sometimes, strong groupness. Thus, 
fundamentalism combines ideological, moral, and social rigorousness, whereas other 
absolutisms may emphasize mainly one of the above, ideological (e.g., communism), moral 
(e.g., moral vegetarianism), or social (e.g., nationalism) purity. Of interest, monotheistic 
religions worship a God who is perceived to be the source of truth, goodness, and oneness.  
The bonding dimension seemed almost irrelevant in explaining fundamentalism, 
possibly because the items measuring item do not specifically focus on negative emotionality. 
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The only exception was the religious Catholic countries, possibly because of the emphasis in 
these cultures on ritualistic orthopraxy.  
The multiple regression analysis, in the total sample, of fundamentalism on the 
relevant variables together with their interactions provided additional information. The 
significant interactions found between religiousness and (low) existential quest, and between 
religiousness, (low) existential quest, and authoritarianism, confirmed what is broadly 
accepted in the literature (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; 
Rowatt et al., 2013), that is, highly dogmatic believers, and those highly religious who are 
authoritarian and dogmatic, tend to adopt a fundamentalist orientation.  
However, beyond these interactions, religiousness, authoritarianism, and existential 
quest, each alone, continued to have an independent effect in predicting fundamentalism. 
Thus, not all is about the interaction of rigid socio-cognitive orientations with religiousness. 
On the one hand, being authoritarian or inflexible in existential convictions may compel 
people, in specific contexts, toward fundamentalist ideas, practices, and identity even if they 
are not intense believers or high religious moralists, simply because they are social 
conformists or unwilling to question their worldviews. On the other hand, the intensity of 
religiousness, for some people, even if they are not necessarily authoritarians and low 
questers, may facilitate their endorsement of fundamentalist beliefs and practices. Believing in 
the superiority of one’s religion and religious ideas and values with regard to other faiths and 
human morality may constitute a common feature of religious intensity and fundamentalism.  
Interreligious Prejudice as a Function of Religiousness and Socio-Cognitive Orientations 
 A typical outcome of religious fundamentalism is religious prejudice (Altemeyer, 
1996; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Rowatt et al., 2013). In the present research, we focused 
on interreligious prejudice. Is such prejudice present basically among religious authoritarians 
or among dogmatic religious people? Does it result exclusively from rigid socio-cognitive 
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orientations, with religiousness not having any proper role? Or does religious intensity 
uniquely account for interreligious prejudice? 
Across the seven cultures, we consistently found that authoritarianism and low 
existential quest were associated with, and uniquely and additively predicted, interreligious 
prejudice. This clarifies previous research by showing that authoritarianism and cognitive 
need for order and non-change are not overlapping but constitute distinct pathways for 
interreligious prejudice. Furthermore, religiousness, though variable religious dimensions, 
added unique variance in explaining prejudice in most religious-cultural zones. (In the US and 
secular Europe, religion’s effect was explained by only the socio-cognitive orientations). 
Finally, our multiple regression analysis in the total sample confirmed the unique and 
additional role of the above distinct variables, but also the role of the interactions between 
them, in predicting interreligious prejudice: religious authoritarians and dogmatic religious 
people are more prone to show interreligious prejudice, very likely because they perceive 
members of other religions as ideological and moral outgroups.  
Which religious outgroup is seen most negatively? Contrary to the idea that anti-
atheist prejudice is strongest across the world (Gervais et al., 2017), in most cultural zones 
(with the exception of Turkey and the US, which were the two less secular cultures), mean 
attitudes toward atheists were the least negative compared to the negative attitudes toward 
religious outgroups. This may partly be due to the young age and educational status of 
participants, especially in secular cultures. On the contrary, in all relevant religious-cultural 
zones, the most negative attitudes were toward Muslims, in line with evidence on increased 
Islamophobic feelings across the world (Helbling, 2012).  
However, when focusing on the associations of fundamentalism with the various 
prejudices, the highest associations across cultures were those with anti-atheist attitudes, 
suggesting religious absolutists are primarily opposed to their full ideological, moral, and 
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social opponents, the atheists. In terms of negative attitudes toward religious outgroups, the 
associations between fundamentalism and anti-Buddhist attitudes, followed by those toward 
the fictitious religion, were, in most cultural zones, higher than the ones regarding other 
groups, in particular Jews and Muslims. Fundamentalism was even unrelated to anti-Jew 
sentiments in European countries of Western Christian tradition and unrelated to anti-Muslim 
attitudes in secular Europe. Our interpretation, in line with research on proscribed versus 
prescribed religious prejudice (Batson et al., 1993; Hall et al., 2010), is that anti-Semitism and 
Islamophobia are generally condemned by (Christian) religious authorities today, especially in 
the West. No such proscription of prejudice toward Buddhists has been elaborated.  
The lack of explicit proscription of prejudice may also explain the considerable 
strength of the anti-Christian attitudes as a function of fundamentalism we found in the two 
non-Christian monotheistic contexts (Islam in Turkey and Judaism in Israel), as well as anti-
Muslim fundamentalist attitudes in Israel and anti-Jewish attitudes in Turkey. The opposition 
between monotheisms seems to be stronger in non-Christian cultural contexts. 
In Greece, the association of fundamentalism with anti-Jew attitudes was higher 
compared to the anti-Muslim attitudes may reflect the absence of thorough religious education 
against anti-Semitism in the Christian Orthodox world (Blümel, 2017). Finally, 
fundamentalism was unrelated to prejudice in Taiwan, a country marked by East Asian 
religions, in particular Buddhism. Buddhist religiosity does not seem to follow Western 
monotheisms in nourishing interreligious prejudice (Clobert et al., 2015), possibly due to 
West-East cross-cultural/religious differences on compassion and tolerance of incongruity 
(Clobert et al., 2017). 
Limitations and Further Questions 
The samples were composed of mostly young students in the humanities and the social 
sciences. Young adults are often lower in religiosity compared to the general population and 
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may not represent “real” older adult fundamentalists. Further research is needed to consolidate 
the generalizability of the findings in other ages and more focused groups. Nevertheless, 
fundamentalism, measured as a continuous variable, provided here meaningful and coherent 
results in line with previous research. If anything, one could anticipate the effects to be 
replicable if not stronger in older adult and more highly religious samples. Prudence also is 
needed not to equalize fundamentalism, a not uncommon form of religiousness across the 
world, with violent religious militantism.  
 Another limitation is that dogmatic belief, moral rigorism, and strong groupness were 
measured here indirectly, as the combination of rigid socio-cognitive orientations with 
religious dimensions. Though theoretically innovative and heuristically rich, having provided 
here meaningful and cross-culturally consistent results, our approach was exploratory. Future 
studies should better operationalize and distinguish between dogmatic, moralistic, and 
communitarian dimensions of fundamentalism (Saroglou, 2016; Wibisono et al., 2019) and 
investigate their respective psychological characteristics and outcomes.  
A question remains: does religion predict no interreligious tolerance at all? Previous 
research relying on self-reports has shown that some religious orientations (e.g., religion-as-
quest and devotional religion), to some extent, and rather in secular contexts, predict low 
intergroup, including low interreligious, prejudice (Hansen & Ryder, 2016; Van Assche et al., 
2020). Yet other research questions the dichotomy between “good” religion predicting 
tolerance and “bad” religion predicting prejudice (Batson et al., 1993). Our work indicated 
that, in secular contexts, religiousness may not predict prejudice toward monotheistic 
religious outgroups; but still predicts prejudice toward other religious outgroups, unknown 
religious groups, and atheists. Believing intensely and using religion as a guide of morality 
predicted interreligious prejudice beyond the effects of cognitive and sociomoral rigidity 
across cultures suggesting that this should be an important agenda for further research. 
FUNDAMENTALISM ACROSS CULTURES                                                                        28 
 
Conclusion 
The present research provided new theorization and results of interest for the fields of 
personality and social psychology, cross-cultural psychology, and psychology of religion. 
Fundamentalism does not seem to be restricted to US Protestant literalism or to Islamic moral 
rigorism, but, across religious cultures, religious fundamentalism integrates the cognitive and 
the sociomoral aspects of religious absolutism. Moreover, across religious cultures, 
fundamentalism seems similar in its basic components by integrating the cognitive, moral, 
and occasionally social components of religiousness with critical personal dispositions toward 
authoritarianism and inflexibility in worldview. Finally, across various cultural zones 
representing most major world religions, this religious absolutism combining religiousness, 
authoritarianism, and dogmatism, results into negative prejudicial attitudes toward some or all 
kinds of religious outgroups.   
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Table 1 















Fundamentalism 2.39(1.02) 3.65(1.09) 3.66(1.69) 2.87(1.15) 3.00(1.30) 4.85(1.54) 2.70(0.78) 
Rel. Dimensions 2.75(1.54) 3.94(1.74) 4.04(1.72) 3.14(1.40) 3.60(1.64) 4.68(1.64) 3.73(1.00) 
   Believing 2.95(1.71) 4.06(1.92) 4.08(1.85) 3.38(1.63) 3.50(1.82) 5.10(1.81) 3.91(1.30) 
   Bonding 2.89(1.65) 3.97(1.84) 4.21(1.80) 3.13(1.53) 3.90(1.86) 4.51(1.87) 4.02(1.27) 
   Behaving 2.53(1.74) 3.92(1.97) 4.07(1.97) 3.21(1.76) 3.40(1.95) 5.44(1.86) 3.76(1.29) 
   Belonging 2.62(1.74) 3.79(1.88) 3.82(1.86) 2.85(1.52) 3.60(1.77) 3.68(1.87) 3.24(1.20) 
Authoritarianism 3.17(0.83) 4.11(0.81) 3.74(0.89) 3.67(1.00) 3.69(0.94) 3.96(1.01) 3.81(0.71) 
Existential Quest 4.77(0.98) 4.41(1.02) 4.29(1.02) 4.37(1.07) 4.17(1.10) 4.50(1.15) 4.90(0.84) 
Neg. Attitudes t.        
   Atheists 3.15(1.40) 3.91(1.56) 4.41(1.81) 4.01(1.63) 4.43(1.71) 5.76(1.79) 3.51(1.32) 
   Buddhists 3.75(1.37) 4.04(1.51) 3.91(1.59) 4.11(1.42) 4.81(1.49) 5.63(1.56) 3.86(1.09) 
   Catholics 3.45(1.43) 2.85(1.54) 3.26(1.49) 3.69(1.38) 5.23(1.14) 5.34(1.63) 4.27(1.07) 
   Jews 4.02(1.32) 4.14(1.36) 3.70(1.44) 4.64(1.37) 2.15(1.27) 5.67(1.56) 4.68(1.06) 
   Muslims 4.60(1.37) 4.89(1.43) 4.49(1.58) 4.82(1.37) 6.08(1.04) 1.81(1.35) 4.89(1.15) 
   Yxtos 4.40(1.34) 4.85(1.48) 4.57(1.49) 4.89(1.49) / 5.84(1.52) 4.58(1.12) 
Total Prejudice 3.97(1.06) 4.35(1.17) 4.21(1.32) 4.49(1.16) 5.13(1.06) 5.65(1.38) 4.31(0.87) 
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Table 2 
Coefficients of Correlations of Religious Fundamentalism with the Four Basic Religious 
Dimensions and Socio-Cognitive Orientations, Distinctly by Cultural Religious Zone 
















Rel. Dimensions        
   Believing  .51 (.46)  .51 (.50)  .75 (.70)  .56 (.48)  .70 (.66)  .79 (.70)   .23 (.18) 
   Bonding  .39 (.37)  .49 (.43)  .61 (.48)  .43 (.38)  .52 (.41)  .67 (.57)   .02 (.02) 
   Behaving  .52 (.48)  .48 (.45)  .76 (.67)  .65 (.60)  .80 (.77)  .78 (.67)   .24 (.21) 
   Belonging  .51 (.44)  .45 (.43)  .70 (.55)  .58 (.48)  .59 (.50)  .56 (.45)   .35 (.37) 
SC Orientations        
   Authoritarianism  .42 (.41)  .48 (.39)  .62 (.52)  .49 (.46)  .59 (.55)  .53 (.38)   .24 (.27) 
   Existential Quest -.19 (-.27) -.29 (-.24) -.47 (-.50) -.26 (-.42) -.38 (-.39) -.48 (-.45) -.17 (-.11) 
 
Note. In italics: nonsignificant results. All other associations are significant at least at p < .01. 
In parentheses: correlations on religionists only. EU: Europe. SC: socio-cognitive.  
 
  
FUNDAMENTALISM ACROSS CULTURES                                                                        37 
 
Table 3 
Multiple Regressions of Religious Fundamentalism on the Four Basic Religious Dimensions 
and Socio-Cognitive Orientations, Distinctly by Cultural Religious Zone 
                                                                            
Predictors 
Secular 













   Total (Ns)     
 1.204 757 412 163 147 250 256 
Rel. Dimensions        
   Believing  .29***  .29***  .33***  .14  .24**  .33***  .17* 
   Bonding -.06  .18*** -.05 -.07 -.02  .09 -.11 
   Behaving  .15**  .03  .26***  .34***  .54***  .30***  .01 
   Belonging  .14** -.05  .09†  .19* -.10  .03  .28*** 
SC Orientations        
   Authoritarianism  .26***  .30***   .27***  .30***  .17**  .10*  .15* 
   Exist. Quest -.16*** -.20*** -.19*** -.19* -.24*** -.18*** -.17** 
Adj. R2 .42 .42 .74 .48 .72 .70 .18 
   Religionists     
 579 525 236 117 124 231 97 
Rel. Dimensions        
   Believing  .26***  .33***  .34***  .15  .20*  .31*** -.02 
   Bonding -.01  .08 -.05 -.07 -.09  .11 -.10 
   Behaving  .18**  .01  .25***  .35*  .62***  .24***  .07 
   Belonging  .07  .05  .06  .10 -.11  .03  .41*** 
SC Orientations        
   Authoritarianism  .29***  .24***   .22***  .18*  .18**  .09*  .19* 
   Exist. Quest -.22*** -.16*** -.25*** -.23** -.25*** -.22*** -.18† 
Adj. R2 .41 .35 .65 .45 .70 .57  .19 
 
*** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .10. 
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Table 4 
Multiple Regression of Fundamentalism on Religiousness (Four Dimensions), Socio-
Cognitive Orientations, and the Interactions of the Latter with Religiousness 
 Total  Sample  Only Religionists 
Predictors B t-test  B t-test 
Religiousness: Believing  .26  11.04***   .26   9.29*** 
Religiousness: Bonding  .01    0.60   .02    0.88 
Religiousness: Behaving  .32  12.79***   .34  12.02*** 
Religiousness: Belonging -.02   -1.16  -.08  -3.34** 
RWA-Authoritarianism  .27  20.49***   .24  13.09*** 
Existential Quest -.20 -15.51***  -.19 -10.27*** 
Religiousness  RWA  .02    1.43   .02    1.00 
Religiousness  Existential Quest -.08   -6.28***  -.09   -4.47*** 
Relig.  RWA  Ex. Quest  .05    4.10***   .08    4.10*** 
Adj. R2: 59, .55      
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Table 5 
Coefficients of Correlations of Religious Fundamentalism and Socio-Cognitive Orientations 



















Atheists RF  .31***  .33***  .58***  .46***  .59***  .63***  .07 
 Relig.  .32***  .46***  .43***  .56***  .46***  .58***  .14* 
 RWA  .21***  .23***  .44***  .45***  .38***  .53***  .07 
 EQ -.08** -.23*** -.35*** -.24** -.21* -.35***  .00 
Buddhists RF  .18***  .29***  .38***  .21**  .40***  .47*** -.14* 
 Relig.  .05†  .23***  .13**  .17*  .24**  .40*** -.37*** 
 RWA  .22***  .20***  .33***  .37***  .43*** .36*** -.02 
 EQ -.15*** -.21*** -.32*** -.29*** -.41*** -.28*** -.14* 
Catholics RF -.24*** -.31*** -.05†  .04  .48***  .38*** -.14* 
 Relig. -.45*** -.57*** -.26*** -.03  .42***  .32*** -.25*** 
 RWA -.15*** -.25*** -.01  .11  .40***  .39*** -.02 
 EQ -.01  .09* -.04 -.18* -.13 -.26***  -.04 
Jews RF  .04  .04  .12*  .21** -.24**  .39***  .01 
 Relig. -.10†  .00 -.10*  .26*** -.29***  .30*** -.18** 
 RWA  .19***  .08**  .13**  .37*** -.26**  .27***  .04 
 EQ -.09** -.06 -.18*** -.25**  .08 -.24*** -.05 
Muslims RF  .03  .18***  .18***  .12  .25** -.60***   .03 
 Relig.  .00  .16***  .00  .17*  .19* -.56*** -.16* 
 RWA  .22***  .13***  .19***  .24**  .39*** -.38*** -.04 
 EQ -.07* -.16*** -.13** -.17* -.13 .28***  .04 
“Yxtos” RF  .05  .21***  .27***  .22**   ―  .44***  .02 
 Relig.  .06†  .24***  .08†  .36***   ―  .38*** -.21** 
 RWA  .15***  .19***  .27***  .42***   ―  .35***  .10 
 EQ -.07* -.14*** -.24*** -.26***   ― -.26***  .00 
 
*** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .10. 
Note. In italics: results for attitudes toward religious ingroup. RF: religious fundamentalism. 
Relig.: religiousness. RWA: right-wing authoritarianism. EQ: existential quest.  
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Table 6 
Multiple Regressions of Interreligious Prejudice on Religiousness and Socio-Cognitive 
Orientations, Distinctly by Cultural Religious Zone 
                                                                            
Predictors 
Secular











   Total    
Believing -.06  .15*  .08 -.06  .08  .10 
Bonding  .01  .09 -.18*  .24* -.06 -.00 
Behaving -.01  .05  .28*  .13  .33*  .40*** 
Belonging  .15*  .03 -.04  .17  .09  .02 
Adj. R2 .01 .08 .04 .15 .17 .24 
   Religionists    
Religiousness  .03  .24*** -.02  .21**  .22**  .27*** 
Authoritarianism  .23***  .11**   .27***  .31***  .35***  .27*** 
Exist. Quest -.06* -.16*** -.20*** -.19* -.14+ -.15** 




FUNDAMENTALISM ACROSS CULTURES                                                                        41 
 
Table 7 
Multiple Regression of Interreligious Prejudice on Religiousness (Four Dimensions), Socio-
Cognitive Orientations, and the Interactions of the Latter with Religiousness 
 Total  Sample  Only Religionists 
Predictors B t-test  B t-test 
Religiousness: Four Dimensions  .16    8.30***   .11    4.35*** 
RWA-Authoritarianism  .24  12.16***   .24   8.93*** 
Existential Quest -.14  -7.14***  -.15  -5.49*** 
Religiousness  RWA  .05    2.94**   .02    0.58 
Religiousness  Existential Quest -.05   -2.85**  -.02   -0.87 
Relig.  RWA  Ex. Quest  .04    1.95*   .00    0.15 
Adj. R2: 17, .14      
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Figure 1 
Religiousness and (Low) Existential Quest as Predicting Fundamentalism Among Low (Left) 
and High (Right) Authoritarians 
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Figure 2 
Religiousness and Authoritarianism (Left) or Existential Quest (Right) as Predicting 
Interreligious Prejudice 
         
 
